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ESSAY: SETTING THE BASES OF A POLICY
FRAMEWORK TO COVER OLD-AGE RISK
Pablo Arellano Ortiz*
This Essay proposes a coherent vision about the protection of
old-age pensions and establishes a public policy strategy that
allows the protection of a country’s entire population.
It
attempts to connect the action of the State, through the notion of
the welfare state, with the protection of pension systems. It
proposes three levels of protection: (1) the welfare state, (2) state
regulation, and (3) pension scheme regulation. The first Section
of this Essay reviews welfare states, explains their categories, and
discusses their protective effects.
The second Section
examines how to structure the various pension schemes into a
coherent pension system under a single protective logic,
postulated after the Chilean Pension Reform of 2008. Finally, the
third Section explains how pension schemes provide pension
coverage to a greater number of people.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization and changes in labor markets have made the
protection against old-age risk more complex.1 State action and
private sector programs have become insufficient for the majority
of the global population.2 To protect more effectively against this
risk, it is necessary to reevaluate the current policies and
strategies of income protection.3 A review of current day
regulations should be evaluated on two levels: (1) the State and
(2) the mechanisms of risk protection.
The State viewpoint considers the different interactions
between public and private actors involved in the program.4
Thus, the notion that the welfare state plays a key role is an
accurate statement, and a review showing its origin, evolution,
and current problems is appropriate.5 This Essay analyzes classic
and new classifications of protection schemes6 and examines the
eventual export of this concept from developed countries to
emerging regions.7
Regarding the mechanisms of old-age risk protections, many
countries have hybrid models of protection from old-age risk.8
These hybrid models have also been categorized as “multi-pillar”
1. Old-age risk is one of nine social classic risks covered by social security. These
nine risks were set in 1952 by ILO Convention no. 102. C102 – Social Security
(Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102), Int’l Lab. Org.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTR
UMENT_ID:312247 [https://perma.cc/V6C8-74BS].
2. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS: DEVELOPMENT
AND REFORM (Colin Gillion et al. eds., Int’l Lab. Office, 2000) [hereinafter SOCIAL
SECURITY PENSIONS].
3. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, BUILDING DECENT SOCIETIES: RETHINKING
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN STATE BUILDING (Peter Townsend, Geneva: Int’l Lab.
Office, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
4. I will use my previous study on the subject. PABLO ARELLANO ORTIZ, Estado de
Bienestar: un sello europeo y su pretendida proyección mundial”, in Programa de Estudios Europeos UDEC, in TENSIONES EN EUROPA: DESAFIOS PARA LA INTEGRACIÓN 89107 (RIL Editores, 2013).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Peter H. Lindert proposes this idea. PETER H. LINDERT, Can the European Welfare model be exported?, in BUILDING DECENT SOCIETIES: RETHINKING THE ROLE OF
SOCIAL SECURITY IN STATE BUILDING (Peter Townsend, Geneva: Int’l Lab. Office,
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
8. For a review of different models see ROBERT HOLZMAN & RICHARD HINZ, OLD
AGE INCOME SUPPORT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON
PENSION SYSTEMS AND REFORM (World Bank Pub. 2005); WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE
OLD AGE CRISIS: POLICIES TO PROTECT THE OLD AND PROMOTE GROWTH (World Bank,
Oxford U. Press 1994); SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2.
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models.9 However, these models often do not provide coverage for
all populations.10 The coverage policy, to provide maximum
protection, should be based under a single logic based on the
capacity to contribute to the future beneficiaries. While the
protection of old-age risk is rooted in the basis of a single logic
model based on contributory capacity, the compliance of the right
to a pension with the principle of subjective universality is an
unrealized quest in many countries.11 The two components of a
social security system, non-contributory and contributory
mechanisms, should be assessed by their overall ability to cover
the entire population.12 The first component includes a Stateprovided non-contributory mechanism, which responds to
international and constitutional obligations of protection for a
population.13 The second component involves both mandatory
and voluntary contributory mechanisms that enable people to
obtain protection against old-age risk on their own accord.14 The
blending of these two mechanisms characterizes the universal
right to a pension.15
Because the problem of aging is a global issue,16 it requires a
global solution. Accordingly, a successful public pension policy
should consider three levels of protection: (1) the welfare state, (2)
state regulation, and (3) pension scheme regulation. As for the
third level, in relation to protection regimes, many pension
options should be considered,17 such as whether the mechanism is
9. See HOLZMAN & HINZ, supra note 8; SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2,
at 27.
10. Pablo Arellano Ortiz, Marco de análisis del sistema de pensiones chileno
después de la reforma de 2008, 19 REVISTA DE DERECHO 21, 21-43 (2012).
11. See PABLO ARELLANO ORTIZ, LECCIONES DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL (Librotecnia
2015).
12. Arellano Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43.
13. PABLO ARELLANO ORTIZ, UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME DANS LE RÉGIME
DES RETRAITES, L’EXEMPLE DU CHILI (L’Harmattan 2012) [hereinafter UNIVERSALISME
ET INDIVIDUALISME]; PABLO ARELLANO ORTIZ, Universalism and Individualism in
Chilean pension law: an example of extension of coverage for Eastern Europe, in
LABOUR MARKETS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
219-231 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2012) [hereinafter LABOUR MARKETS].
14. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13.
15. Id.
16. Social protection for older persons: key policy trends and statistics, INT’L LAB.
ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/dgreports/dcomm/documents/
publication/wcms_310211.pdf [https://perma.cc/QD66-FD5G] [hereinafter Social
protection for older persons].
17. See Nicholas Barr, Economic theory and the welfare state: A survey and
interpretation, 30 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 741, 741 (1992); Nicholas Barr & Peter
Diamond, Reforma de pensiones, principios, errores analiticos y orientaciones politicas,
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“pay-as-you-go” or “individual capitalization;” whether the
administration is public or private; or whether it is financed
through contributions, taxes, or a non-contributory mechanism.18
62 REV. INTERNACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 5, 5-33 (2009); Nicholas Barr, Garantía
de los derechos proporcionados por los regimenes de prestaciones privados,
Investigaciones & Puntos de vista N° 10, Iniciativa de la AISS, enero, 2003 ; Nicholas
Barr, La verdad sobre la reforma de pensiones, 26 ANÁLISIS LABORAL 24, 24-27 (2002);
Nicholas Barr, La réforme des retraites: mythes, vérités et choix stratégiques, 55 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE 3, 3-48 (2002); Esteban Calvo, Fabio M.
Bertranou, & Evelina Bertranou, Are old-age pension system reforms moving away
from individual retirement accounts in latin america?, 39 J. OF SOC. POL’Y 223, 223234 (2010); Fabio Bertranou, Esteban Calvo, & Elevina Bertranou, Is Latin America
retreating from individual retirement accounts?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT
BOSTON C., (2009), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/IB_9-14-508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K3K8-DMJM]; ROBERT HOLZMANN & ROBERT PALACIOS, Les comptes
individuels en tant qu’assurance sociale : une perspective de la Banque Mondiale, in
CONSTRUIRE LA SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE: LA PRIVATISATION EN QUESTION 61-80 (Xenia
Scheil-Adlung, P. Lang 2002); Estelle James, New systems for old age security. Theory,
practice, and empirical evidence, THE WORLD BANK POL’Y RES. DEP’T POVERTY AND
HUMAN
RESOURCES
DIVISION,
(1997),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/695471468739536790/pdf/multi0page.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PH8U-T7PG];
SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2; Katharina Müller, Contested universalism:
from Bonosolto Renta Dignidad in Bolivia, 18 INT’L J. OF SOC. WELFARE 163 (2008);
Mitchell A. Orenstein, La crisis de la privatización de las pensiones: ¿desaparición o
resurgimiento de una tendencia política global?, 64 REV. INTERNACIONAL DE
SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 73, 73-90 (2011); INT’L LAB. ORG., PENSIONES EN AMÉRICA LATINA.
DOS DÉCADAS DE REFORMA, GINEBRA (Int’l Lab. Office 1998); INT’L LAB. ORG.,
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SECURITY (Int’l Lab. Office 1984); Monika Queisser, Après le
Chili, les réformes de la deuxième génération en Amérique Latine, 48 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE 27, 27-45 (1995).
18. For a better understanding of this concepts it should be consider under the
terminology set by professors Nicholas Barr and Peter Diamond, as follows: A
“contributory basic pension” is a pension paid, often at a flat rate, to a person with a
full record of contributions, or pro rata to a person with an incomplete contributions
record. A “defined-benefit (DB) pension” is a pension in which the benefit is
determined as a function of the worker’s history of pensionable earnings. The formula
may be based on the worker’s final wage and length of service, or on wages over a
longer period, for example, the worker’s full career. A DB system may be fully or
partially funded, or unfunded. In a pure DB arrangement, the sponsor’s contributions
are adjusted to meet obligations. Insofar as the degree of funding is maintained,
contributions are adjusted to meet anticipated obligations; thus, the risk of varying
rates of return to pension assets falls on the sponsor. A defined-contribution (DC)
pension” is a pension in which the benefit is determined by the value of assets
accumulated toward a person’s pension. Benefits may be taken as a lump sum, as a
sequence of withdrawals, or by purchase of an annuity. The expected discounted value
of benefits is equal to the value of assets, referred to as benefits being determined
actuarially. Thus, a pure DC plan adjusts obligations to match available funds, so that
the individual bears the portfolio risk. “Fully-funded pensions” pay all benefits from
accumulated funds. “Partially- funded pensions” pay benefits both from accumulated
assets and from current contributions. A noncontributory universal pension is based
on years of residence. “Notional defined-contribution (NDC) pensions” are financed on
a pay-as-you-go or partially-funded basis, with a person’s pension bearing a quasi-
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All these components aim to answer the same question: how can
we protect old-age income security?19 The decision to implement
a program by one feature or another is often based on ideological
and political rationales rather than technical issues.20 This Essay
does not develop these themes, but instead, analyzes the higher
levels of rationale for the public policy decision-making side of the
programs.
Additionally, this Essay does not refer to the different types
of pension reform programs, such as a parametric reform were the
formula is adjusted, or a structural reform in which scheme is
changed for another.21 Alternatively, this Essay focuses on a
vision for a system providing old-age protection. In this vision, to
meet the objective universal old-age protection standard, it is
necessary to design a system that contains multiple elements.22
This approach allows for better reflection on the history of pension
protection to develop a current system for current times.23 A
policy framework that considers all actors and all mechanisms
will be more successful in extending universal coverage.24 Under
actuarial relationship to his or her lifetime pension contributions. “Pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) pensions” are paid out of current revenue (usually by the state, from tax
revenue) rather than out of accumulated funds. Partially-funded pensions are often
referred to as PAYG. Barr & Diamond, supra note 17. For an explanation of noncontributory mechanisms see Pensiones no contributivas y asistenciales, INT’L LAB.
ORG. (2002), http://interactions.eldis.org/sites/interactions.eldis.org/files/database_sp/
Chile/Pensiones%20Asistenciales%20(PASIS)/asocfile.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VA6S8ZSL].
19. PABLO ARELLANO ORTIZ, RETO ACTUAL DE LAS PENSIONES DE VEJEZ: ¿FIN DE
LAS AFP? ¿REGRESO A REPARTO? (Librotecnia 2015).
20. Id.
21. See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Reversing pension privatization: the experience of
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Hungary, INT’L LAB. OFFICE, GENEVA (2014),
http://www.ilo.org/gimi/gess/RessourcePDF.action?ressource.ressourceId=43277
[https://perma.cc/SH3R-XETG]; CARMELO MESA-LAGO, Lecciones y desafíos de 23 años
de reformas estructurales de pensiones en América Latina, in EL SISTEMA DE PENSIONES
EN CHILE EN EL CONTEXTO MUNDIAL Y DE AMÉRICA LATINA: EVALUACIÓN Y DESAFÍOS,
PONENCIAS DEL SEMINARIO INTERNACIONAL 45 (Int’l Lab. Org. 2004); Carmelo MesaLago, Política y reforma de la seguridad social en América latina, 160 NUEVA
SOCIEDAD
133
(1999),
available
at
http://nuso.org/media/articles/downloads/2757_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5ZN-JPAY].
22. See Social protection for older persons, supra note 17; Robert L. Brown,
Criteria for the optimal design of a social security retirement system, 2 INT’L J. OF SOC.
SECURITY AND WORKERS COMP. 79, 79-90 (2010).
23. See Social protection for older persons, supra note 17; ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra
note 19.
24. This trend on extension of coverage can be seen in ILO documents. E.g.,
Extending social security to all: A guide through challenges and options, INT’L LAB.
ORG.
(2010),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@
publ/documents/publication/wcms_146616.pdf
[https://perma.cc/39DN-W55G]
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this framework, the retirement system would become a coherent
whole, combining elements of universalism and individualism, to
protect the entire population through a system that has only one
logic.25
II. WELFARE STATE: CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES
The concept of the welfare state is relatively new26 and is
attributed to Robert Titmuss, who in the 1950s, developed a series
of studies examining the actions of protective policies of social
risks.27 Over time, the concept of a “welfare society” developed to
refer to a similar, or very closely related, framework of protection.
The concept of a welfare society ignores the protection from the
state and analyzes how a society evolves and protects at an
individual level. This framework has two elements: (1) a judicial
element, mainly based on the legal protection of human rights,
and (2) an economic element.28
In addition to these two concepts, the concept of “state
protection” became important after World War II,29 particularly
during the “30 Glorious,” which refers to the thirty-year period
following World War II, also characterized as Europe’s
“reconstruction period”.30 Subsequently, during the 1980s and
1990s, questions and reflections arose on the utility of a welfare
state.31 The concept is not well received unanimously and has
been a great topic of debate in Europe as well as other regions.32
[hereinafter Extending social security]; Tripartite Meeting of Experts on Strategies for
the Extension of Social Security Coverage, INT’L LAB. ORG. (2009),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_protect/-soc_sec/documents/
publication/wcms_secsoc_14323.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8ZM-WW8B] [hereinafter
Tripartite Meeting].
25. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13.
26. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 89-107.
27. RICHARD M. TITMUSS, ESSAYS ON “THE WELFARE STATE” (Allen & Unwin,
Londres, 3d ed. 1976). For others, the expression was first used by William Temple
and even by Bismarck. See Luis Enrique de la Villa Gil, ¿Qué es eso del Estado del
Bienestar y cómo se mide, histórica y económicamente?, 3 REV. DERECHO SOCIAL Y
EMPRESA 15, 19 (2015).
28. de la Villa Gil, supra note 28, at 18-21.
29. JEAN-JACQUES DUPEYROUX, MICHEL BORGETTO, & ROBERT LAFORE, DROIT DE
LA SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE (Dalloz, 16 ed. 2015).
30. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 89-107.
31. Id.
32. E.g., FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MERRIEN, RAPHAËL PARCHET & ANTOINE KERNEN,
L’ETAT SOCIAL: UNE PERSPECTIVE INTERNATIONALE (Armand Colin 2005); PIERRE
ROSANVALLON, LA CRISE DE L’ÉTAT PROVIDENCE (Seuil 1981); Isabella Mares, Les
conséquences de l’Etat providence pour l’économie, 60 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
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In a welfare state model, the State takes an active role in
protecting its population against the social risks of old-age income
insecurity.33 The sociologist Gosta Esping-Andersen proposes a
classification of three different forms of a welfare state.34 The first
is a liberal welfare state (as seen in the United States, Canada,
Australia), in which the assistance is based on a needs
assessment, modest universal transfers, and predominately social
insurance plans. The second form is a social democratic welfare
state (as seen in Northern Europe), in which there is a dualism
between the State and market, the working class and the middle
class, and those seeking equality at a high level instead of a low
level. Thirdly, Esping-Andersen proposed a corporatist welfare
state (as seen in Germany, Italy, France), in which the program
is strongly linked to the government where the liberal obsession
with the market and market performance is never prominent.
These classifications are differentiated by three characteristics:
(1) the role of the state, (2) public or private financing of benefits,
and (3) the role of the private sector.35 However, EspingAndersen’s classifications only take into account countries where
the State has an established and sustainable social security
system.36 These classifications can be utilized in southern
hemisphere countries and even more so in non-western countries
where welfare states have not been identified.37 This concept has
not been fully developed, and exporting the European model may
be difficult to effectuate.38
On the other hand, new categories of welfare states have
replaced Esping-Andersen’s classic-style categories in Europe
today.39 Other authors have proposed five new and more
71 (2007); Christophe Ramaux, Quelle théorie pour l’Etat social?
Apports et limites de la référence assurantielle, 1 REVUE FRANÇAISE DES AFFAIRES
SOCIALES 13 (2007).
33. GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSON, LES TROIS MONDES DE L’ETAT-PROVIDENCE (Presses
Universitaires de France 1999).
34. Id.; See also GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSON, The sustainability of welfare states
into the 21st century, in GLOBALIZATION AND WELFARE: A CRITICAL READER 50-60 (Ritu
Vij, Palgrave Macmillan 2007); GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSON & BRUNO PALIER, TROIS
LEÇONS SUR L’ETAT-PROVIDENCE (Seuil 2008). For critics to this classification see
MERRIEN, PARCHET & KERNEN, supra note 32; ROSANVALLON, supra note 32.
35. ESPING-ANDERSON, supra note 34.
36. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 89-107.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. YURI KAZEPOV & STEFANIA SABATINELLI, Los ingresos mínimos y la
integración social: Disposiciones institucionales en Europa, in PROTECCIÓN E
INCLUSIÓN SOCIAL: EXPERIENCIAS Y POLÍTICAS 79-107 (Int’l Lab. Org. 2008), available
SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE
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expansive categories of welfare states, including: (1) the liberal
welfare state; (2) the social democrat welfare state; (3) the
corporatist welfare state; (4) the family-based system; and (5) the
transition model.40
The liberal welfare state (as seen in the United States and
the United Kingdom), in which the State is in charge of social
welfare, is seen as a relatively residual system where intervention
occurs only when neither the market nor the family have
managed to allocate resources. The market is the prevailing
mechanism of regulation and integration in a highly
individualized and competitive society. Next, the social democrat
welfare state (as seen in Denmark), in which social welfare by the
State is omnipresent, assumes the responsibilities of the family
and the market where benefits are universally and generally
applied to all citizens according to their needs. Thirdly, the
corporatist welfare state is one in which the State provides social
welfare conceived in a meritocratic way.
These first three regimes reproduce the socioeconomic range,
reaching families in the labor market in accordance with the
position of the head(s) of the household, which mirrors their work.
The family is the predominant social entity, and accordingly
receives strong support from state benefits in kind and cash.
Market dependence is higher in the corporatist model than in the
social democratic model, but lower than in the liberal model.
Like the corporatist model, the family-based system (as seen
in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece) is meritocratic and
fragmented, but is less generous and very unbalanced in granting
benefits in services and in kind. Far fewer resources are allocated
to family policies (passive subsidiarity), to other contributory
regimes, and to regimes verifying economic resources. The
consequence is that families are overloaded with social care
responsibilities receiving little to no resources from the State. The
transition model (as seen in Central and Eastern Europe) is not
yet a fully-developed, consolidated model possessing its own
characteristics. The institutional framework to counter the
conditions that produce vulnerability has undergone a radical
change since 1989. The transition model’s contents depend on the
culture of each country.
A recent study attempted to analyze whether this fivecategory European welfare state model can be exported to
at http://staging.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2006/106B09_338_span.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AT6J-CQG3].
40. Id.
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developing countries.41 To this end, the study decided to simplify
the term “welfare state,” defining it as: when a country devotes
20% or more of gross domestic product (GDP) to social
transfers/benefits.42 The study shows that developing countries
today spend more on social transfers than advanced Organization
for Cooperation and Development (OCD) countries.43 Countries
such as Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico meet advanced levels
of high spending,44 but it is not certain whether these countries
have a model comparable to the European welfare state model. A
country’s GDP spending figure may be useful for comparing
different needs of different cultures. However, a study that only
uses GDP as the benchmark oversimplifies the problem.45
While the study can be criticized for its analysis method, the
author succeeds on the assertion that the European welfare state
model hardly emulates developing countries.46 Moreover, the fact
that the welfare state model remains important in Europe and
continues to help stabilize society, remains a strong argument for
those who attempt to demonstrate its usefulness for welfare
states in the developing world.47
In regions such as Latin America, Eastern Europe, China,
and India, where the majority of the population is excluded from
welfare state classifications, the European concept of the welfare
state seems to fit, for various reasons, within national order.48 It
is precisely in these countries where extension policies are most
needed.49 It should be necessary to open the concept of welfare
state to new cultures and stop considering it as a term that
exclusively refers to European systems of social protection.50 The
idea of a State as the guarantor of protection must be adopted in
cultures outside the western world to include characteristics of
other regions’ labor markets.51
Nevertheless, the debate

41. LINDERT, supra note 7; but see de la Villa Gil, supra note 28, at 63 (In a similar
sense, it can be criticized.).
42. LINDERT, supra note 7.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 89-107.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. For a view of the Latin American context see Andres Uthoff, Brechas del
Estado de bienestar y reformas de pensiones en América Latina, 89 REV. CEPAL 9, 937 (2006).
49. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 89-107.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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surrounding the concept will keep intellectuals and scholars
occupied for a long time. Some welfare state characteristics are
the result of a long evolution: the combination of different
mechanisms and different actors, and the development of a
relationship between the mechanisms and actors.52
III. A POLICY BASED ON THE CONTRIBUTORY CAPACITY
The second level of protection postulates the coordination of
a protection policy for old-age risk. This policy must consider the
various regimes with a systemic view of what is to be protected
before examining each particular regime.53 Accordingly, various
reports analyze the protection of old-age risk as a protective
system.54
At present, the strategies to cover the population have
different characteristics but their objectives are the same: to
provide pension coverage during old age.55 They often consist of
models based on the idea of “pillars of protection.”56 The image of
a pillar evokes the vision of columns supporting a building.57
However, the current definition in social security protection
embodies a more complex vision than a mere vertical support of a
building.58 We often talk about multi-pillar systems of protection
as a set of different protection mechanisms: differentiated
coverage, “pay-as-you-go,” and capitalization.59 Thus, the multipillar model of social protection is illustrated as a multi-story
building (vertical coverage), which provides different forms of
coverage to diverse groups of the population (horizontal

52. ESPING-ANDERSON, supra note 34.
53. Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43.
54. Florencia Aníta & Arnaldo Provasi Lanzara, La multipilarización de los
sistemas previsionales en el escenario posreforma: Chile, Uruguay y Brasil, 64 REV.
INTERNACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 63, 63-82; Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43;
LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 13; ESTELLE JAMES, Los tres – o cuatro? – pilares de un
sistema previsional, in EL FORTALECIMIENTO DE LOS NUEVOS SISTEMAS PREVISIONALES:
EL ROL DE CADA PILAR EN LA SOLUCIÓN DEL PROBLEMA DE LAS PENSIONES 37 (Editado
por CIEDESS 2005); ESTELLE JAMES, THE WORLD BANK’S THREE-PILLAR SYSTEM: WILL
IT PROVIDE INCOME SECURITY TO THE WORLD’S AGING POPULATION? (Am. Inst. for
Contemp. German Stud. 1997).
55. E.g., HOLZMAN & HINZ, supra note 9; SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note
2.
56. E.g., HOLZMAN & HINZ, supra note 9; WORLD BANK, supra note 9; SOCIAL
SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2.
57. For example, the construction of the European Law model.
58. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13.
59. E.g., WORLD BANK, supra note 9; SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2.
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coverage).60 The image of a pillar as a vertical structure may be
inappropriate when referring to pension systems.61 To evaluate
the coverage of pension systems in the context of the aging crisis,
the World Bank62 and the International Labor Organization
(ILO)63 have proposed two models of multi-pillar coverage.
However, a more expansive view is needed, such as the one
implemented after the Chilean Pension Reform of 2008.64 An
explanation of this systemic view will follow the discussion of the
Chilean system examples.
Since the reform in 2008, the Chilean system has moved
away from the multi-pillar model and towards a single-pillar
model with two components: one contributory component, such as
contributions to individual savings accounts,65 and one non60. Arellano Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43; UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME,
supra note 13.
61. Arellano Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43.
62. The World Bank multi-pillar model is a combination of five elements: (1) a
noncontributory, or “zero pillar,” (in the form of a demogrant or social pension) that
provides a minimal level of protection; (2) a “first-pillar” contributory system that is
linked to varying degrees of earnings and seeks to replace some portion of income; (3)
a mandatory “second pillar” that is essentially an individual savings account; (4)
voluntary “third-pillar” arrangements that can take many forms, (individual,
employer sponsored, defined benefit, defined contribution) but are essentially flexible
and discretionary in nature; and (5) informal intrafamily or intergenerational sources
of both financial and nonfinancial support to the elderly, including access to health
care and housing. HOLZMAN & HINZ, supra note 9, at 42. See also WORLD BANK, supra
note 9; Lucy Roberts, La retraite entre épargne individuelle et assistance: la recette de
la Banque mondiale, 48 Chronique Internationale de l’IRES 1 (1997); James, supra
note 17; James, supra note 56; Estelle James, Fournir une meilleure protection et
faciliter la croissance: argument en faveur du rapport La crise du vieillissement, 49
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE 3 (1996); Estelle James, Réforme des
retraites. Comment parer à la crise du vieillessement, 32 FINANCES & DÉVELOPPEMENT
4 (1995).
63. The ILO model is based on four pillars: (1) a bottom anti-poverty tier of means
tested benefits, and financed from general revenues, which provide income support for
those without others means; (2) a second pay-as-you-go defined benefit tier, mandatory
and publicly managed, which would provide a moderate replacement rate (say around
40 or 50 per cent of lifetime average earnings) for all those who has contributed to it,
and which would be fully indexed; (3) a third tier, which would be defined contribution
based, mandatory up to a determined ceiling, possibly managed by private pension
agencies, and which would provide a pension by means of annuities; and (4) fourth
tier, which would be defined contribution based, voluntary, without ceiling and also
managed by private pension agencies. SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2.
64. For the origins of the reform see Alberto Arenas de Mesa, Historia de la
Reforma Previsional Chilena, INT’L LAB. ORG. (2010), http://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/—-americas/—-ro-lima/—-sro-santiago/documents/publication/
wcms_178562.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CWP-TD28].
65. Regarding individual accounts see HOLZMANN & PALACIOS, supra note 17, at
61-80.
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contributory component, funded from taxation, resulting from the
recent integration of “solidarity pensions.”66 The contributions
accrue from a compulsory system,67 which has increased the
disparities in pension benefits between different social classes of
citizens.68
These disparities, along with the increasingly
precarious nature of employment as a result of globalization and
the rise in the informal sector, make the establishment of a
universal retirement benefit essential.69
The multi-pillar system provides different levels of coverage,
which are represented as several pillars in a horizontal position.70
This scheme can have as many levels as the model considers
pillars.71 For example, the system can focus on a basic pillar, such
as “pay-as-you-go,” another pillar consisting of defined
contributions, and still another consisting of defined benefits.72
However, none of these pillars alone provide universal coverage.
Furthermore, each pillar provides just one type of coverage
limited to a worker’s salary. In general, it can be argued that a
horizontal multi-pillar system does not fulfill the principle of
subjective universality.73
Some scholars argue that this reform introduces a pillar of
solidarity.74 However, this solidarity is different than the
solidarity in Europe’s public pension systems.75 Both the World
Bank and the ILO have proposed a multi-pillar model utilizing a
66. Before the 2008 reform, the regime consisted of two parts, contributory and
non-contributory. See Hugo Cifuentes Lillo, Características generales del Sistema de
Seguridad Social Chileno, I Parte, REV. LABORAL CHILENA 62 (2005); HUGO
CIFUENTES LILLO, PABLO ARELLANO ORTIZ & FRANCISCO WALKER ERRÁZURIZ,
SEGURIDAD SOCIAL: PARTE GENERAL Y PENSIONES (Librotecnia 2013); ARELLANO
ORTIZ, supra note 11.
67. For an explanation of the contributory mechanism see Colin Gillion &
Alejandro Bonilla, La privatización de un régimen nacional de pensiones: El caso
chileno, 111 REV. INTERNACIONAL DEL TRABAJO 193, 193-221 (1998).
68. Arellano Ortiz, supra note 19.
69. In this sense, I have published Ortiz, supra note 19. See also La protección
social de cara al futuro: acceso, financiamiento y solidaridad, COMISIÓN ECONÓMICA
PARA AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE (CEPLAC) (2006), http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/2808/S2006004_es.pdf?sequence=1
[https://perma.cc/MT595FQZ]; Uthoff, supra note 48, at 9; Daniel Tielman & Andres Uthoff, El papel del
aseguramiento en la protección social, 81 REV. DE LA CEPAL 103 (2003).
70. Arellano Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. The official position of the government when the law came into force.
75. See Social protection for older persons, supra note 17; SOCIAL SECURITY
PENSIONS, supra note 2.
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“basic pillar,” or “pillar zero,” as the foundation to a system for
old-age protection as a way to protect the most vulnerable part of
the population.76 In this protection regime, each “pillar” supports
a different logic and covers a different class of the population.77
The idea of protecting a population in a precarious situation
is the basis of Chilean solidarity pensions.78 The Chilean pension
system utilizes a single-pillar model, based on an individual’s
ability to save.79 The State projects the benefits as a form of
solidarity and the benefits are only paid in the case of partial or
total inability to save for retirement.80 Thus, in the Chilean
system, the transition from one mechanism to another depends on
an individual’s ability to save throughout his life.81 The essence
of the Chilean system is the ability to save individually, which
76. E.g., HOLZMAN & HINZ, supra note 9; WORLD BANK, supra note 9; SOCIAL
SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2, at 27.
77. Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43.
78. A presidential commission that analyzed the old-age coverage and proposed
changes that were adopted later in the pension reform in 2008. The commission
published the report as Consejo Asesor Presidencial para la Reforma Previsional, El
Derecho a una vida digna en la vejez, hacia un Contrato Social con la Previsión en
Chile. Volumen I, Diagnóstico y Propuestas de Reforma, Santiago (2006) [hereinafter
El
Derecho
a
una
vida
digna],
https://www.sbif.cl/sbifweb/servlet/
Ebook?CTR=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX&ID_EBOOK=L3252&position=1.
This can be
also be noted in the region. See Mesa-Lago, supra note 21. It can also be found in
several ILO documents where it can be identified the lack of coverage de juere or de
facto. See, e.g., Int’l Lab. Org. Advisory Group, Social Protection Floor for a Fair and
Inclusive
Globalization,
INT’L
LAB.
ORG.
(2011),
http://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@publ/documents/publication/wcms_165
750.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4HV-YW8G]; General Survey concerning social security instruments in light of the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization,
INT’L LAB. ORG. (2011), http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_norm/-relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_152602.pdf [https://perma.cc/URH2-2D9B]; Social
security for social justice and a fair globalization, INT’L LAB. ORG. (2011)
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_152819.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y3VG-UYW8];
Extending
social
security, supra note 24; Reunión tripartite, supra note 24; Recovering from the Crisis:
A Global Jobs Impact, INT’L LAB. ORG. (2009), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_norm/—-relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_108456.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4C24-2R6Q]; Setting Social Security Standards in a Global Society,
INT’L LAB. ORG. (2008) http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_protect/
-soc_sec/documents/publication/wcms_secsoc_5953.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8SP-DGJX].
All these efforts led to the approval of a new ILO instrument on social security, but
this time concerning social protection.
See R202 – Social Protection Floors
Recommendation,
2012
(No.
202),
INT’L
LAB.
ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTR
UMENT_ID:3065524 [https://perma.cc/4CNK-BNRB].
79. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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determines whether the State’s intervention is total, partial, or
unneeded.82
To clarify the framework of the Chilean system, reference
should be made to fundamental legal principles83 essential for
Chilean social security.84 Chilean law and the social security
doctrine recognize these principles, but there is no unanimous
agreement about their application to the Chilean system.85
However, the Chilean social security system has adopted the
principles of universality, solidarity, comprehensiveness,
efficiency, consistency, and subsidiarity. 86 For the purposes of the
present study, an in-depth analysis of the principle of universality
is provided. This principle can be understood in terms of
“objective universality,” according to which all social
contingencies are covered.87 The concept can also be understood
in terms of “subjective universality,” according to which all
citizens or residents must be protected.88 The entire population
is covered, but coverage is achieved by means of minimum
benefits.89
For example, Chile has opted for “subjective
universality” where the entire population is covered, but coverage
is subject to conditions for obtaining basic benefits.90 The
principle of “subjective universality” in Chile is the result of a
combination of public and private mechanisms, all based on the
ability to save.91 The analysis of pension rights necessarily
includes an analysis of the entire pension system and not just
pension fund mechanisms.92
82. Id.
83. R UTH
PREVISIONAL

G ABRIELA L ANATA F UENZALIDA, M ANUAL DE LEGISLACIÓN
9 (Universidad de Concepción Departamento de Derecho Laboral, 2d

ed. 2000).
84. Id.
85. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13.
86. On social security principles see ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 11; Ricardo
Hormazabal, El sistema de AFP chileno: una visión critica, 9 REV. CHILENA DE
ADMINISTRACIÓN PUBLICA 121, 123 (2007); FUENZALIDA, supra note 84, at 9; Juan
Sebastian Gumucio Rivas, De reparto a capitalización: la experiencia chilena, II Parte,
12 REV. LABORAL CHILENA 62, 66-74 (1996); SALVADOR VALDÉS-PRIETO, POLÍTICAS Y
MERCADOS DE PENSIONES: UN TEXTO UNIVERSITARIO PARA AMÉRICA LATINA 36
(Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1st ed. 2002).
87. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 11.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. For my view on this principle see ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 11; Hugo
Cifuentes Lillo, Características generales del Sistema de Seguridad Social Chileno: I
Parte, 136 REV. LABORAL CHILENA 61, 61-69 (2005).
91. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 19.
92. Id.
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Traditionally, the World Bank has classified the Chilean
system of pension funds as a system that fits within the
multi-pillar structure devised.93 However, following the reform in
2008, this classification is no longer appropriate.94 On one hand,
elements of the Chilean pension model appear to fit easily into a
multi-pillar structure in which “pillar zero” is the noncontributory pension (that may benefit 60% of the population).
The first pillar is mandatory capitalization and the second pillar
consists of individual and collective voluntary contributions.
However, it should be emphasized that they are voluntary and
complementary to the mandatory pillar.95 On the other hand, it
may be argued that the Chilean system no longer adopts the
framework of a multi-pillar model, but instead constitutes a
single-pillar model.96 While there are different mechanisms (noncontributory,
mandatory
contributions,
and
voluntary
contributions), the Chilean pension system is based on a
single-pillar model fundamental principle: the ability to save
individually.97 This ability determines the mechanism applicable
to a particular case, so an individual without the ability to save
will receive a solidarity (non-contributory) pension, an individual
with a limited ability to pay will receive a solidarity-based top-up
benefit, and an individual who has a significant ability to make
voluntary contributions will be entitled to a contributory
pension.98
The articulation of these mechanisms in a single-pillar
model, along with the coherent character, can be graphed as
follows:

93. This is the view of the public administration, for more details see
http://www.spensiones.cl [https://perma.cc/ZLU5-3GMY].
94. Arellano Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43.
95. Id.
96. For more details on this opinion see UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra
note 13; Pablo Arellano Ortiz, El pilar solidario, la solución esperada para nuestro
sistema de AFP, 164 REV. LABORAL CHILENA 86, 86-88 (2008).
97. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13.
98. Id.
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Source: Arellano Ortiz (2012).

IV. FINAL REMARKS
The analysis in this Essay proposes a postulate to design
protection against old-age risk to provide better coherence to the
social security system.99 It extends coverage to those not included
under a social insurance mechanism based in a right-based
approach.100
The example of the Chilean pension system
demonstrates that a multi-pillar model is no longer the only way
to analyze a pension system.101 Additionally, the Chilean pension
system provides the elements necessary to meet the international
social security standards laid out by the ILO.102 Viewing the
coverage as a single concept provides an understanding of today’s
99. Arellano Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43.
100. This type of extension is what the ILO calls a “horizontal extension,” and it
is part of the staircase approach promoted by the ILO. See Tripartite Meeting, supra
note 25, at 18.
101. LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 13, at 219-31.
102. I propose this in ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 11. See also Juan Sebastián
Gumucio Rivas, (2009) Descripción del sistema chileno de seguridad social desde la
perspectiva del Convenio Núm 102 de 1952 de OIT, 8 REV. LATINOAMERICANA DE
DERECHO SOCIAL 131,131-70 (2009).
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pension problems as a whole.103 Pensions should incorporate the
realities of all the population and not focus solely on
contributions.104 The solution should also consider the evolution of
the welfare states under internal and external factors in the present
time. In relation to old-age risk, the solution should also consider the
coherent approach that this paper presents. A useful welfare state
outside Europe is one that can be adapted to the social security
culture where it is applied.

103. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13.
104. E.g., SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2; El derecho a una vida
digna, supra note 78.

